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COMMENT: PUBLIC OFFERINGS AND
PRIVATE SALES OF SECURITIES
Ajai Singht
A number of studies have examined public offers of securities,
and several others document the stock market's reaction to the announcement of private placement of corresponding securities. The
purpose of this Comment is to compare and contrast the market's reaction to announcements of public offers and private placements of
similar securities.
It is interesting that public offers of common stock, and other securities convertible into common stock, evoke a large negative response from the stock market.1 Myers and Majluf, among others, argue that managers are likely to sell common stock when it is overvalued.2 The sale of undervalued stock dilutes the market value of preexisting stockholders' equity and the market realizes that insiders
have an incentive to issue overvalued equity. Accordingly, the market treats announcements of new equity offers as negative information. It is argued that securities convertible into common stock are
quasi-equity and can be thought of as back door offers of equity. The
stock market similarly treats announcements of convertible securities
(convertible bonds or convertible preferred, convertible into shares of
common stock) as negative information. The magnitude of the reaction to convertible offers, however, is slightly less negative. 3 Offers
of non-convertible (straight) debt are associated with a negative but
relatively neutral response.
This set of market responses to public offers of securities is consistent with explanations offered by Myers and Majluf.4 It suggests
that the investors are suspicious of sales of equity-like securities and
t Professor, Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University.
1 See infra Table 1.
2 See Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment
Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187,
194-95 (1984).
3 See Larry Y. Dann & Wayne H. Mikkelson, ConvertibleDebt Issuance, CapitalStructure Change and Financing-RelatedInformation: Some New Evidence, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 157,
184-85 (1984).
4 See Myers & Majluf, supranote 2, at 214-15.
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treat the associated announcements as a release of negative information. On the other hand, announcements of private placement of
common stock and securities convertible into common are associated
with significantly positive stock price reactions. It has been argued
that smart institutional investors agree to a private purchase of a security only if they have performed due diligence and are satisfied with
the prospects of the firm. Additionally, large investments made by a
relatively small group of institutional investors assure the investing
public that the issuing firm will be monitored. By agreeing to subject
themselves to increased monitoring by sophisticated investors, managers are signaling that they are unlikely to misuse the free cash flows
of the firm. Thus, reduced agency costs will also be a positive signal
to the investing public. Accordingly, announcements of private
placements of equity and quasi-equity securities are associated with a
positive reaction.5
This evidence is consistent with announcements of firms entering into a bank loan agreement. It is argued that banks have expertise
in information collection processing and monitoring of firms' ongoing activity. Thus, when firms announce that they are entering into a
bank loan arrangement, these announcements are met with a positive
stock market response. 6 It is argued that the presence of a sophisticated monitoring agency (namely the bank) reduces the agency cost
for the remaining investors and results in increased stock price.
As in the case of public offers of non-convertible (straight) debt,
the private placement announcements are also met with a negative but
relatively neutral market response.
CONCLUSION

Public offers of equity and quasi-equity securities evoke a
negative response from the stock market. In contrast, private
placements of these same securities are associated with a positive
reaction. It is argued that public offerings of common stock and
convertibles are viewed as a sale of oveivalued securities and are
accordingly treated as negative information. Private placements
signal increased monitoring by sophisticated investors and arguably reduce agency costs. Therefore, the reaction is positive. Pub5 See Karen Wruck, Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value: Evidence from
Private Equity Financings, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 23 (1989) ("The announcement of a private sale
of equity... increases shareholder wealth by 4.5% on average."); see also L. Paige Fields &
Eric L. Mais, The Valuation Effects of Private Placements of Convertible Debt, 46 J. FIN. 1925,
1926 (1991) (hypothesizing that private placement announcements create positive reactions
because of the effects of such placement on ownership structure, tax situation, and information
regarding future cash flow).
6 See Christopher James, Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans, 19 J. FIN.
ECON. 217, 226 (1987) ("The positive stock price response to bank loan agreements contrasts
with the non-positive response to public offerings of securities reported by other researchers.").
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lic and private sales of non-convertible (straight) debt are viewed
as an informationally neutral event.
Table 1
A Summary of Announcement Period Common Stock Average
Abnormal Returns, Recorded Across Studies, for Public Offerings and Private Sale of Common Stock, Convertible Debt,
Straight Debt, and Bank Loans
Security Type

Public Offer

Private Placements

Common Stock

-3.14% 7

4.5%8

Convertible Debt

-2.31% 9

1.80%"'

Straight Debt

-0.26%"

-0.91% 12

(not regarded by the
author as statistically
significant)
Bank Loans

n/a

1.93% 13

7 Clifford W. Smith, Investment Banking and the CapitalAcquisition Process, 15 J. FIN.
ECON. 3,5 (1986).
8 Wruck, supranote 5, at 23.
9 Dann & Mikkelson, supranote 3, at 171.
10 Fields & Mais, supranote 5, at 1925.
" Smith, supra note 7, at 5; see also B. Espen Eckbo, Valuation Effects of Corporate
Debt Offerings, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 119, 148 (1986) ("Straight debt offerings have a non-positive
impact on the issuing firn's common stock price ..
"); Wayne H. Mikkelson & M. Megan
Partch, Valuation Effects of Security Offerings and the Issuance Process, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 31,
51 (1986) ("The average price reaction to the announcement of... straight debt... is small and
not significant... ").
12 James, supranote 6, at 225; see also Mikkelson & Partch, supra note 11, at 58 (finding
no statistically significant difference in the reactions to straight debt financing through public
offering or private placement).
13 James, supra note 6, at 225.

